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THE MIDWEST PIPING DOCTRINE: AN
EXAMPLE OF THE NEED FOR
REAPPRAISAL OF LABOR
BOARD DOGMA
JULIUS GETMANtW HN rival unions vie for employee support, an employer must
behave in a neutral fashion. He must treat them alike and may
not grant to one union or its members advantages which he
withholds from the others.' The National Labor Relations Board has
long held that recognizing or negotiating an agreement with one of the
rivals is a form of assistance to that union in its campaign for employee
support.2 However, recognition is a form of assistance which must be
given special treatment. The effectuation of employee choice, the interest
which gives rise to the employer's duty of neutrality, often requires that
a majority union be granted recognition despite the interference which
recognition may cause the organizing efforts of its rivals. This is most
clearly so when one of the rival unions has been certified by the Board
as the majority representative. Similarly, although operation under a
collective bargaining agreement may aid an incumbent union to main-
tain support, it is not feasible to require an employer to withdraw
recognition each time a new union comes on the scene.
The Midwest Piping doctrine 3 is a Board-formulated rule to distin-
t Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-66 (1958) (hereinafter cited as the act); NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S.
206 (1940); California Cotton Co-op. Ass'n, 110 N.L.R.B. 1494 (1954). An employer is
permitted to state his preference. Rheem Mfg. Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 404 (1955); Sylvania
Electric Products, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1953). But he may not threaten reprisals if
the employees reject his opinion or promise benefits if they go along. Superior Engrav-
ing Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 215 (1949); Seamprufe Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 892 (1949).
2 Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Corp., 63 N.L.R.B. 686 (1945); Elastic Stop Nut Corp.,
51 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1944).
3 The name derives from Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
The employer in that case had been advised by the CIO that it represented a majority
of the employees in a unit which had, until that time, been unorganized. The CIO at
the same time filed a representation petition with the NLRB. The employer entered
into negotiations with the AFL which also claimed to represent a majority. About two
months later the AFL presented membership cards to the employer indicating that it
did represent a majority and on that basis the AFL and employer concluded a union
shop agreement. The CIO filed a petition with the Board claiming a violation of
§ 8(a)(1). The Board, in granting the petition, held that the employer's recognition of
the AFL was unjustified and that this action, taken in the face of representation pro-
ceedings pending before the Board, in effect corrupted those proceedings.
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guish between those situations in which the grant or maintenance of
recognition is a violation of the act and those situations in which it is
permissible or required. Essentially the doctrine requires an employer
to withhold or withdraw recognition when "faced with conflicting claims
of two or more rival unions which give rise to a real question concerning
representation .... "4
In this formulation of the doctrine, a "question concerning repre-
sentation" is a term of art derived from section 9(c)(1) of the act which
provides that the Board may direct an election after a hearing, "if the
Board finds upon the record of such hearing that . . . a question of
representation exists." In representation proceedings the Board uses the
terms "question of representation" and "question concerning representa-
tion" interchangeably.5 Therefore, in every election there has been a prior
determination that a question concerning representation exists.6
In Midwest Piping cases the adjectives "real" or "genuine" are often
added to "question concerning representation." 7 As used by the Board
they add nothing to the statutory term. The tests used to determine
whether an election is appropriate are the same tests employed to deter-
mine the applicability of the Midwest Piping doctrine8 and the Board has
uniformly applied it whenever a question concerning representation 9 is
4 Novak Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1574 (1958). See also, e.g., North Elec. Co.,
129 N.L.R.B. 675, 676 (1960), enforcement denied, 296 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1961); Shea
Chem. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027, 1029 (1958); William Penn Broadcasting Co., 93
N.L.R.B. 1104, 1105, 1106 (1951).
5 See, e.g., Cone Mills Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 830, 83 (1954); Advance Pattern Co., 80
N.L.R.B. 29 (1948). This usage was granted statutory recognition when section 8(b)-
(7)(A) was added to the act in 1959, 73 Stat. 519.
6 Ibid.
7 Shea Chem. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027, 1029 (1958); Radio Corp. of America, 74
N.L.R.B. 1729, 1731 (1947); Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1070 (1945).
8 Signal Oil & Gas Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 1427 (1961), enforced, 303 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.
1962); Buitoni Foods Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 767 (1960); St. Louis Independent Packing Co.,
129 N.L.R.B. 622, 629 (1960), enforced, 291 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1961); Shea Chem. Corp.,
supra note 7, at 1029; William Penn Broadcasting Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1104-06 (1951);
General Elec. X-Ray Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 997 (1946).
9 Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 64, 54 L.R.R.M. 1109 (1963); Tri-W
Construction Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1962); Twin County Transit Mix Inc., 137
N.L.R.B. 1708 (1962); Signal Oil & Gas Co., supra note 8; Brittany Dyeing and Printing
CorlS., 126 N.L.R.B. 785 (1960); Novak Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1958); Indianap-
olis Newspapers Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 1750 (1953), enforcement denied, 210 F.2d 501 (7th
Cir. 1954); International Harvester Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1949); Flotill Prods., Inc., 70
N.L.R.B. 119 (1946). From 1954 until 1958 the Board did not apply the Midwest Piping
doctrine to agreements signed with incumbent unions regardless of the existence of a
question concerning representation. This exception, enunciated in William D. Gibson
Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 660 (1954), was overruled in Shea Chem. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027
(1958).
In Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1947), while election ob-
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found to exist. It has held that unless a question concerning repre-
sentation exists the doctrine is inapplicable.10
The Board has not sought to justify its decision to make the doctrine
coextensive with the existence of a question concerning representation.
Such an approach does, however, simplify the Board's task in deciding
whether or not to apply the doctrine. 1 Moreover, the policy is consistent
with the Board's view that the purpose of the doctrine is to protect
employee choice by protecting the integrity of the Board's election
processes.12 Thus, the Midwest Piping doctrine is applied where, but
only where, a Board election is appropriate.
The courts have accepted the Board's verbal formulation of the doc-
trine in terms of the existence of a question concerning representation' 3
but have generally used the term "question concerning representation"
to signify a situation in which the employer is ignorant of the wishes
jections made by the winning union were "technically . . . still pending before the
Board," the losing union became defunct. Id. at 1445. The Board declined to apply
the Midwest Piping doctrine. It pointed out that this was not a case involving rival
claims since at the time of recognition the recognized -union was "the only labor or-
ganization claiming to represent [the] employees." Id. at 1444.
10 Downtown Bakery Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1352 (1962); Buitoni Foods Corp., 126
N.L.R.B. 767 (1960); Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958); William
Penn Broadcasting Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1104 (1951); Lift Trucks, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 998
(1948).
In Pittsburgh Valve Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 193 (1955), enforcement denied on other
grounds sub nom. District 50, UMW v. NLRB, 235 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1956), and Sun-
beam Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 546 (1952), the Board applied the Midwest Piping doctrine
despite the absence of a statutory question concerning representation. The Sunbeam
case was overruled sub silentio in Buitoni Foods Corp., supra. In Pittsburgh Valve Co.,
the charging union's petition was dismissed due to the fact that the bargaining unit
was expanding. A Board election would have been available as soon as the expansion
was complete. Thus the policy of applying the Midwest Piping doctrine where a Board
election is immediately available was applicable despite the absence of a question con-
cerning representation. The Pittsburgh Valve case might well be decided the same way
today by the Board, although the Board's language in subsequent cases has strongly re-
affirmed the identity of the doctrine with the existence of a statutory question concerning
representation. Buitoni Foods Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 767 (1960); Shea Chem. Corp., 121
N.L.R.B. 1027, 1029 (1958).
11 Thus, for example, in Swift & Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 732 (1960), enforcement denied,
294 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1961), the Board rejected a series of complex arguments against
application of the doctrine by pointing out that "the timely filing of a petition sup-
ported by an administratively determined showing of interest in fact raises a real
question concerning representation." 128 N.L.R.B. at 736.
12 National Container Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 1544 (1953), enforced, 211 F.2d 525 (2d
Cir. 1954); International Harvester Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1949); Flotill Prods., Inc., 70
N.L.R.B. 119, 121 (1946); NLRB, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 38-39 (1946).
13 NLRB v. Swift and Company, 294 F.2d 285, 286-87 (3d Cir. 1961); NLRB v. North
Elec. Co., 296 F.2d 137, 139-40 (6th Cir. 1961); Cleaver-Brooks Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 264
F.2d 637, 642 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959); NLRB v. National Container
Co., 211 F.2d 525, 536 (2d Cir. 1954).
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of his employees. 14 As a result many Board decisions applying the doc-
trine have been reversed 15 when brought to the courts for enforcement.
In representation proceedings a question concerning representation
is raised by the filing of a petition if it has not been raised earlier by a
demand for recognition. 16 But in Midwest Piping cases the courts have
rejected this criterion for the existence of a question concerning repre-
sentation. Thus in St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. NLRB (one
of the few cases enforcing a Board Midwest Piping order) the court
rejected the Board's conclusion that a real question of representation
had arisen when the challenging union, in support of its claim for bar-
gaining status, filed a representation petition with the Board. The
14 Thus in NLRB v. Swift & Co., supra note 13, at 287, the Third Circuit stated that
application of the Midwest Piping doctrine required "a finding of a real question of
representation, i.e., that the employer had a reasonable basis for believing that the
union no longer represented a majority." See also NLRB v. North Elec. Co., supra note
13, at 140; St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 700, 704 (7th Cir.
1961); Cleaver-Brooks Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 13, at 642; District 50, UMW v.
NLRB, 234 F.2d 565, 569 (4th Cir. 1956). NLRB v. National Container Corp., 211 F.2d
525 (2d Cir. 1954), is the only case I know of in which the court adopted the Board's
definition of a question concerning representation.
In NLRB v. Signal Oil and Gas Co., 303 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1962), the court's defi-
nition of question concerning representation required that the wishes of the employees
be uncertain, but the court held on the basis of International Ladies Garment
Workers v. NLRB, 266 U.S. 731 (1961), that even if the employer did not know
of the rival union's claim at the time he granted recognition, he committed an unfair
labor practice by continuing recognition of an incumbent at a time when employee
choice was uncertain. This is contrary to the Board's position. The Board has indicated
quite clearly that the employer must know of the rival claim in order for the Midwest
Piping doctrine to apply. This generally presents no problem where a petition is filed
since the employer is notified almost immediately. Where no petition is filed there
must be a demand for recognition based on a substantial claim or else no question
concerning representation is raised either for representation or Midwest Piping
purposes. Downtown Bakery Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1352 (1962); Deluxe Metal Furniture
Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958); Siler Mill Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1680 (1951). I believe the
Fifth Circuit's opinion in the Signal Oil case misapplies the Supreme Court's Garment
Workers decision. It would in practice require that an employer cease bargaining
with a union on the basis of a naked claim by another. The reasons why this is
undesirable are set forth in the Board's opinions in General Elec. X-Ray Corp., 67
N.L.R.B. 997 (1946), and Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., supra.
15 NLRB v. North Electric Co., 296 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Swift & Co.,
294 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Wheland Co., 271 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1959); Cleaver-
Brooks Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1959); cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817
(1959); District 50, UMW v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Indianapolis
Newspapers, Inc., 210 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954); Stewart Warner Corp. v. NLRB, 194
F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Standard Steel Spring Co., 180 F.2d 942 (6th Cir.
1950). In only three Midwest Piping cases was the Board's order enforced. NLRB v.
Signal Oil & Gas Co., supra note 14; St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. NLRB, 291
F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. National Container Corp., supra note 14.
16 See, e.g., Casey-Metcalf Mach. Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 1520 (1955); Calcasieu Paper Co.,
109 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1954); Wiley Mfg. Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 40 (1950); Advance Pattern
Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 29 (1948); I. Spiewak & Sons, 71 N.L.R.B. 770, 771 (1946).
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court stated: "The record before us discloses nothing to make petitioner
aware that a 'real question' of representation existed until the Board
ordered an election. The fact that Amalgamated petitioned for repre-
sentation does not in and of itself raise a real question of representation.
It merely shows that Amalgamated asserted a claim to majority repre-
sentation."'17 The court concluded instead that a real question of
representation arose when the Board ordered an election.' s This test
has apparently been accepted in subsequent judicial decisions.19
Similarly, under the Board's definition, the question of representation
is not resolved until a Board election is held and the results certified.20
But the courts take the view that the question of representation is re-
solved and the Midwest Piping doctrine becomes inapplicable when there
has been an expression of majority support for one of the unions.21
17 291 F.2d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 1961).
18 Ibid.
19 NLRB v. North Elec. Co., 296 F.2d 137, 139-40 (6th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Swift
& Co., 294 F.2d 285, 288 (3d Cir. 1961). Using the Board's order of election as the
standard is inconsistent with the courts' own definition of a question concerning
representation. The order of election tells the employer nothing concerning the
strength of the petitioning union's claim for recognition. The Board requires that
a -union support an election petition with a showing of interest by thirty per cent
of the employees in the unit claimed to be appropriate. § 101.18 N.L.R.B. Statements
of Procedure, ser. 8 (1959).
An example of the incongruous results which may be achieved by the use of this
test is offered by a comparison of NLRB v. Swift & Co., supra, with St. Louis Inde-
pendent Packing Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1961). Both cases involved the
same employer, Swift & Co., the same unions, and the same master bargaining
negotiations. The agreements negotiated by the employer and the incumbent were to be
applied to both the Harrisburg plant involved in the Swift & Co. case and the St.
Louis plant. The challenging union filed petitions for election at both plants and
made the necessary thirty per cent showing of interest with respect to both plants.
An election had been ordered at the St. Louis plant but had not yet been ordered at
the Harrisburg plant when the negotiations were completed. There was nothing
in the record to suggest that the company had any more reason to suspect that the
incumbent union no longer represented a majority at the St. Louis plant than it
had to suspect the same with respect to the Harrisburg plant. As far as the possible
coercive effect on the employees' choice of bargaining representative was concerned
there was similarly no basis for distinguishing between the two cases. The courts,
according to the opinions, shared the same definition of a question concerning
representation, yet on the bases of the Board's order of election the Board's decision
was enforced in the St. Louis Independent Packing Co. case, but denied enforcement
in the Swift 6- Co. case.
20 Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 64, 54 L.R.R.M. 1109 (1963); Twin
County Transit Mix, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1708 (1962); The Wheland Co., 120 N.L.R.B.
814 (1958), enforcement denied, 271 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1959); Indianapolis Newspapers
Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 1750 (1953), enforcement denied, 210 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954); Radio
Corp. of America, 74 N.L.R.B. 1729 (1947).
21 NLRB v. Wheland Co., 271 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1959); Cleaver-Brooks Mfg. Corp. v.
NLRB, 264 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1959); District 50, UMW v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 565 (4th Cir.
1956); NLRB v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 210 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954); NLRB v.
Standard Steel Spring Co., 180 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1950).
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This difference in definition between the Board and the courts stems
from differing views as to the function of the Midwest Piping doctrine.
As noted above, the Board views the doctrine in part as a way of insuring
the integrity of its election machinery. It thus holds the doctrine appli-
cable whenever an election is appropriate, and the Board will go ahead
with an election despite a prior expression of majority sentiment.
The courts on the other hand have thought of the Midwest Piping
doctrine solely as a technique for preventing the employer from imposing
his own choice of a bargaining representative upon his employees. This
was best articulated by the Seventh Circuit in NRLB v. Indianapolis
Newspapers, Inc.:
The act forbids interference by an employer with the rights of
his employees to bargain collectively, and, for that purpose, to
select their own bargaining representative. When two unions are
vieing [sic] for majority support of his employees, an employer
must, of course, maintain a position of strict neutrality ....
Recognition of one competitor as bargaining agent during this
contest period, absent proof of majority support, is a proscribed
act ....
The Act does not require, however, that this neutrality con-
tinue until the last dissident voice is stilled. Indeed, in keeping
with the purpose of the Act, harmonious employer-employee
relations require that the instability inherent in a contest end
when one contestant is able to muster majority support. Al-
though the prize of recognition must not be employed coercively
to influence the employees in making their decision, once indis-
putable proof of majority choice is presented to the employer,
the Act imposes on him a duty to award recognition to the agent
so chosen by his employees.22
Under this view a statutory question concerning representation may exist
without the Midwest Piping doctrine's being applicable.
The courts have probably been willing to accept formulation of the
doctrine in terms of the existence of a question concerning representation
because, when the term is given a literal rather than a statutory meaning,
it is descriptive of the courts' approach to the doctrine. But the results of
the appearance of agreement have been unfortunate. Judicial review
has been undertaken without recognition of the real basis of the Board's
decision. Thus the Third Circuit in NLRB v. Swift & Co. purports to
apply a substantial evidence test to the Board's "finding .. . that the
employer had a reasonable basis for believing that the union no longer
22 210 F.2d at 503, 504. The Board specifically declined to follow this decision in
Novak Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1958).
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represented a majority." 23 The Board made no such finding. It based
application of the doctrine on "the timely filing of the petition supported
by an administratively determined showing of interest . . .
In addition, because none of the judicial decisions in the area appear
to challenge the doctrine directly, the Board has not felt the need to
elaborate or justify its approach to the doctrine.
The desideratum of clarity suggests that a term which is already a
term of art in the representation area not be given a different meaning
for purposes of the Midwest Piping doctrine. Accordingly, the courts
should use the term "question concerning representation" in Midwest
Piping cases in its statutory sense as it is used by the Board. Hopefully,
the courts and the Board would in turn be forced to challenge* the as-
sumption that the scope of the doctrine and the scope of the term are
coextensive; and the challenge to that assumption might lead to a long
overdue reevaluation of the doctrine by the Board.
The difficulties in the Midwest Piping doctrine are highlighted by
its use in two different but overlapping classes of situations: Where there
is negotiation of an agreement with an incumbent union when a rival
union is seeking to represent the unit and where there has been an
expression of majority sentiment after the question concerning repre-
sentation arises. In both situations, the policy of the Board and of the
courts has been shaped by an assumption which must be evaluated:
That recognition is inherently coercive.
I. APPLICATION OF THE Midwest Piping DOCTRINE TO NEGOTIATION
OF AN AGREEMENT WITH AN INCUMBENT UNION
In 1954 in William D. Gibson Co. 25 the Board created an exception
to the Midwest Piping doctrine to meet the case where an employer
contracted with an incumbent union: A contract negotiated by the
employer and an incumbent would not bar an election, but negotiation
of the contract did not constitute an unfair labor practice as unlawful
interference with the employees' free choice of bargaining representa-
tive.26 The exception was justified on the grounds that "stability in
industrial relations, the primary objective of the Act, requires that con-
tinuity in collective-bargaining agreements be encouraged, even though
a rival union is seeking to displace an incumbent."27 This exception
23 294 F.2d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 1961). See also NLRB v. North Elec. Co., 296 F.2d 137,
140 (6th Cir. 1961), and see Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 930, 948-49 (1963).
24 128 N.L.R.B. 732, 736 (1960).
25 110 N.L.R.B. 660 (1954).
26 Id. at 662.
27 Ibid.
MIDWEST PIPING DOCTRINE
was overruled without discussion in Shea Chem. Corp.28 The closest
the Board has ever come to an explanation of this action was when it
adopted the language of the Trial Examiner in the St. Louis Independ-
ent Packing Co. case. "The situation is no different where one of the
competing unions has been the incumbent bargaining representative
of the employees involved. The right of employees to change their bar-
gaining representative carries no less dignity in the statutory scheme
than their right to choose in the first instance between unions competing
for representative status. '29
On petition for review, the Seventh Circuit similarly concluded that
"The fact that NBPW was the incumbent union and had been certified
some five years earlier did not exempt petitioner from its duty of neu-
trality once a real question of representation arose." 0
The assertion that "the right of employees to change their bargaining
representative carries no less dignity in the statutory scheme than their
right to choose in the first instance," is persuasive so long as it is assumed
that the possible coercive effect of recognition is the same regardless of
whether an outside or an incumbent union is involved.3 1 But such an
assumption would be inaccurate.
Where an incumbent union is involved, whatever aura of responsibility
may otherwise attach to recognition has already been acquired through
the previous history of representation. It cannot be erased by a short
suspension of recognition, particularly since the Board in Shea Chem.
Corp. specifically stated that the employer may permit the incumbent
union to continue administering its contract or processing grievances
through its stewards.3 2
Further, it appears unlikely that employees would view the continua-
tion of dealings with an incumbent as an expression of choice to the
same extent that they would view recognition of one of two outside unions
as such an expression. I doubt that employees concern themselves with
the motives leading to continued dealings. People tend to notice and
to seek to explain new modes of behavior; customary forms are accepted.
Moreover, to the extent that customary behavior is noted, it is more
28 The Board's entire discussion of the point was as follows: "[A]fter full considera-
tion of all the implications of the Gibson exception we have decided to overrule
that case." 121 N.L.R.B. 1027, 1029 (1958).
29 129 N.L.R.B. 622, 629 (1960).
30 St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 1961).
31 If it were merely a question of balancing the interests of industrial stability and
free choice by employees such balancing would seem to fall within the Board's area
of discretion. The Board grants considerable protection to industrial stability through
such devices as its contract bar and certification year rules. Cf. Deluxe Metal Furniture
Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958).
32 121 N.L.R.B. 1027, 1029 (1958).
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likely to be attributed to habit than to choice. New types of behavior
are more likely to be construed as an indication of choice and properly
so. Indeed, withdrawal of recognition may well be viewed as a rejection
of the incumbent union and not as an act of neutrality.33
It is, of course, almost always true that the employer has demonstrated
his willingness to deal with the incumbent union but not with its rival.
However, this demonstration was made before the question concerning
representation arose, probably before the rival arrived on the scene.
This is part of the status of incumbency which cannot be erased by the
withdrawal of recognition contemplated by the Board. Any advantage
which accrues in this situation does not appear to be unfair. I think
its practical effect can be sufficiently neutralized if the employer, as was
done in the Swift cases, 34 makes a clear statement of his willingness to
deal with whatever union the employees choose. The fact that the in-
cumbent was able to establish bargaining relations with the employer
is likely to be taken as proof that the employer will abide by his word.
Negotiation of an agreement with an incumbent union, like nego-
tiation of an agreement with an outside union, provides tangible benefits
which the employees may be tempted to vote to retain. The impact of
this factor on an election is hard to gauge. The effect of a desire to retain
benefits must be balanced against the force of the attitude that the
employer could not go below but might be forced to go beyond his pre-
vious concession if a new union were selected. I do not believe that the
possibility of coercion on this account is sufficient to overcome the dis-
ruptive effects of discontinuing collective bargaining pending an election.
In reaching this conclusion I am in part persuaded by the severe
consequences likely to follow the finding of a violation. With the ex-
ception of the North Elec. Co.35 case, the Board has uniformly required
that the employer withdraw recognition from the union previously
recognized and cease giving effect to the previously negotiated contract.
The withdrawal of recognition is to last until the previously recognized
union "shall have demonstrated exclusive majority representative status
pursuant to a Board-conducted election."3 6
33 I thought of suggesting that this problem be resolved by social science research
into employee attitudes. However, this would make an extremely difficult problem
in attitude research. It would not be surprising if different experiments pointed in
different directions. Rules of conduct legally enforced require more solid grounding
in order to provide a minimum degree of consistency.
34 St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1961); NLRB
v. Swift & Co., 294 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1961); see note 19, supra.
35 129 N.L.R.B. 675 (1960), enforcement denied, NLRB v. North Elec. Co., 296 F.2d
137 (6th Cir. 1961).
36 St. Louis Independent Packing Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 622 (1960); see also Douglas Can-
ning Co. Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1005 (1949). The order to withdraw recognition customary
in § 8(a)(2) cases is called a "Resnick remedy." See Julius Resnick Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 38
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There is thus a hiatus period established by the Board order. Bargaining
is suspended first until the effects of the unfair labor practice have been
"dissipated" and then until an election is held and the results certified.
Moreover, the hiatus period may coincide with the termination of a
collective bargaining agreement. In that case the employees will be denied
the possibility of having new wage rates or other improvements in
their working conditions negotiated for them until the period ends and
an election is held. The cure seems more drastic than the violation and
more likely to hinder the effectuation of free employee choice.
II. APPLICATION OF THE Midwest Piping DOCTRINE TO CASES IN WHICH
THERE HAS BEEN AN EXPRESSION OF MAJORITY SENTIMENT
AFTER THE QUESTION CONCERNING REPRESENTATION AROSE
In the Midwest Piping case the employer sought to justify negotiation
of an agreement with one of the rival unions on the grounds that it
had obtained signed authorization cards from a majority of his employ-
ees. The Board rejected the use of the cards as proof of a majority:
Under the circumstances, we do not regard such proof as con-
clusive. Among other things, it is well known that membership
cards obtained during the heat of rival organizing campaigns
like those of the respondent's plants, do not necessarily reflect
the ultimate choice of a bargaining representative; indeed, the
extent of dual membership among the employees during periods
of intense organizing activity is an important unknown factor
affecting a determination of majority status, which can best be
resolved by a secret ballot among the employees3 7
(1949). In the North Electric case the Board for the first time applied the Midwest
Piping doctrine but did not apply the Resnick remedy. The union in that case had
not filed objections to the election based on the conduct found to violate the Midwest
Piping doctrine. The Board concluded that "Even though the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, a remedy for this violation that resulted in setting aside the
contract and invalidating the certification of the . . . [union] would permit the
Charging Union to accomplish indirectly through the filing of an unfair labor
practice charge what it could not accomplish directly by filing objections to the
election." 129 N.L.R.B. at 676-77. See F. W. Woolworth Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1446
(1954), modified by Ideal Elec. & Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 1275 (1961); Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 453 (1963). Instead the Board ordered respondent to "cease and
desist" from engaging in such conduct-in effect not to do it again. Thus a union
which chooses to go to an election rather than object to pre-election order conduct can
file charges but cannot obtain the benefits of a Resnick remedy. So long as the Board
follows the practice established in the North Electric case, it is unlikely that the losing
union will file charges in such cases. Even if charges were filed the results would be
essentially meaningless. Thus the effect of the North Electric case will likely be to
remove certain cases from the practical scope of the Midwest Piping doctrine rather
than to mitigate the harshness of the remedy applied where Midwest Piping violations
are found. Conduct after the order of election, but prior to the election can sustain
a Resnick remedy. St. Louis Independent Packing Co., supra, at 630.
37 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1070 (1945).
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The Board has applied this language to all other cases in which the
employer has sought to demonstrate through signed authorization cards
that the union recognized represented a majority of employees. 8  As the
doctrine became more and more identified with the existence of a stat-
utory question concerning representation, it became a rigid rule that a
company could not "assume to judge for itself upon a showing of
authorization cards which of the contending unions was the statutory
representative of the employees."-' 9 This approach was carried over to
cases in which other forms of proof of majority were attempted.4 0 The
Seventh Circuit was accurate in stating that "the Board's position is
that nothing short of the results of a secret ballot is a reliable criterion
for recognition of a bargaining agent when two unions are competing
for the employee's support. 41
Conceding that authorization cards are frequently unreliable, the
Board's approach is difficult to justify on grounds other than the tech-
nical existence of a question concerning representation. For one thing,
cards may be a reliable index of sentiment in some cases, and the Board
makes no effort to analyze their reliability on a case by case basis. Nor
has the Board offered any justification for application of the Midwest
Piping doctrine in cases in which other forms of majority proof have
been offered.
The Board's approach to recognition before an election in rival union
cases is in marked contrast to its approach when only a single union is
involved. In the latter situation, even if a question concerning represen-
tation has been raised, the employer is required to recognize a union
which establishes its majority in advance of an election. And author-
ization cards may constitute sufficient proof to require recognition.4 2
It is only where affirmative proof of minority status is available that the
38 Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 64, 54 L.R.R.M. 1109 (1963); Novak
Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1958); The Wheland Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 814 (1958);
Radio Corp. of America, 74 N.L.R.B. 1729 (1947).
89 Novak Logging Co., supra note 38, at 1575.
40 Cleaver-Brooks Mfg. Corp., 264 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1959); Twin County Transit
Mix Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1708 (1962); Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 1750
(1953).
41 NLRB v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 210 F.2d 501, 503 (7th Cir. 1954). See
also NLRB, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 39 (1946). Whether there is any situation short
of that existing in the Ensher case, 74 N.L.R.B. 1443 (1947), in which the employer
would be justified, in the Board's view, in recognizing a union without awaiting an
election is not clear. It is clear that even reliable proof of majority is not enough. See
Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 64, 54 L.R.R.M. 1109 (1963); Twin County
Transit Mix Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1708 (1962).




Board has held recognition in advance of election to be an unfair labor
practice.43
In its Midwest Piping opinions the Board uses language which sug-
gests that under the act its election machinery has some special pertinence
to situations involving rival claims for recognition. In the Novak Logging
Co. case, for example, despite the fact that no petition for an election
was filed, the Board stated: "As reasonably contemplated by the statute
the determination of the existing question concerning representation was
exclusively one for the Board."44 But the language of the act no more
requires an election as the exclusive mode for the settlement of questions
of representation when rival claims exist than it does when a single
union seeks recognition. The distinction is a product of Board decisions
with no effort made to explain the disparity of treatment between the
two classes of cases. It is not easy to explain why, in a single union
situation, recognition on the basis of authorization cards is required
while, when rival claims are involved, it is proscribed.
When the decision facing the employees is whether or not they desire
union representation, recognition may have a greater impact than it does
when the choice is between rival unions. Employees previously opposed
to or afraid of unionism may discover that their fears were groundless
or that the union has obtained more benefits for them than they had
thought that it could. A union once recognized, or once agreement has
been reached, may appear less radical and more responsible than it did
earlier. I would suggest that such a reaction is more likely on the part
of employees previously opposed to any union than it is on the part of
the adherents of one union when another is recognized. Further, the
interest involved in the single union case, in being able to freely select not
to be represented, seems at least as significant as the interest in the free
choice between unions.
It is probably true that authorization cards are less reliable where rival
unions seek recognition than they are normally. It is more likely that a
union man will sign two authorization cards than that an anti-union
man will sign one. But the problem of dual authorization can be dealt
with effectively if the employer takes the trouble to compare the authori-
43 Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 1289 (1959), affd' sub nom. Inter-
national Ladies Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
The Supreme Court in upholding the Board's finding of a violation in this case
stated that the employer could have protected himself by checking authorization
cards to ascertain the wishes of his employees. Id. at 739-40.
44 Novak Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1575 (1958). (Emphasis added.) See also
Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 64, 54 L.R.R.M. 1109 (1963); Swift & Co.,
128 N.L.R.B. 732, 736 (1960); William D. Gibson Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 660, 662 (1954);
Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1070 (1945); NLRB, TENTH ANNUAL
REPORT 39 (1946).
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zation cards obtained by the rival unions. In this way the extent of dual
authorization can be determined together with the relative strength of
the rival claims.
Another possible distinction is that employees are likely to view the
employer's act of recognition as an indication of choice where rival unions
are concerned but as a matter of compulsion when a single claim for
recognition is granted. As is discussed more fully below, I question the
assumption that such a perception by employees will lead them to vote
in accordance with what they take to be the employer's wishes. Pretermit-
ting that question, if the employer announces in advance that he will
grant recognition on the basis of some objective criterion such as author-
ization cards, he should be able to act without having his conduct viewed
as an expression of preference.
Similarly, it has been argued that to permit an employer to grant
recognition on the basis of a manifestation of majority support enables
him to observe "the ebb and flow of fluctuating sentiment" and to make
"timely recognition of the favored union."45 Where the Board properly
finds as a matter of fact that an employer has used this tactic, a finding
of violation would be appropriate, and would likely be upheld by the
courts. But I do not think this practice so widespread that the Board
should infer its existence from the fact of recognition based on authoriza-
tion cards or other proof of a majority. I also think it highly unlikely
that the courts would accept such an inference if it were not supported
by other evidence. When an employer can demonstrate that he was in
fact neutral or that he acted on the basis of some objective criterion
selected in advance of recognition, this rationale is unavailable to sup-
port the Board's application of the doctrine.
There thus seems little support in terms of the interests of the em-
ployees involved for the distinction drawn by the Board between em-
ployers faced with a single claim and employers faced with more than
one claim for recognition. The real basis for the distinction may be,
however, that an election following recognition is likely where rival
claims are involved but is highly unlikely where an employer recognizes
the single union seeking recognition. In applying the Midwest Piping
doctrine the Board is largely concerned with protecting the integrity of
its election processes. If one assumes the coercive effect of recognition,
then even where the union recognized represented a majority at the time
45 See Cleaver-Brooks Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 637, 642 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 817 (1959). The Board itself has never sought to justify application of the
Midwest Piping doctrine on this basis. It was put forward for the first time by Board
counsel in the Cleaver-Brooks case. This tactic is open to an employer faced with a
demand by a single union for recognition. But it is true that an employer is more
likely to favor one union over another than to favor one over none.
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of recognition, the employer's conduct may substantially affect the Board's
election machinery. The period remaining between the time of recogni-
tion and the election can no longer be effectively used to change the minds
of the employees. A shift in sentiment based upon the election campaign
is thereby precluded, and the election merely serves the purposes of
ratifying the employer's previous act of recognition.46
I do not believe, however, that the likelihood of a Board election being
held in the rival union situation justifies the conclusion that an employer
may not therefore recognize a union reasonably and fairly ascertained
to be the choice of a majority of his employees. I believe the Board over-
estimates the effect of recognition in such a situation and, moreover, that
where recognition is withheld pending an election, the danger is out-
weighed by the considerable delay which may ensue before the employees'
statutory right to bargain through representatives of their own choosing
is effectuated. A minority union can delay the election by technical
objection or an unfair labor practice charge.47 And if employers were
compelled to withhold recognition pending an election, minority unions
would be motivated to employ such tactics in order to gain campaigning
time.
It is probably characteristic of bureaucratic enterprises that they give
to their own procedures unwarranted significance. The Board should
realize that its election process is only a means for determining employee
choice. It should not be used as a basis for delaying effectuation of that
choice.
III. THE COERCIVE EFFECT OF RECOGNITION
The Midwest Piping doctrine rests ultimately on the assumption that
recognition is a potent form of assistance to the recognized union. Both
the Board and the courts have treated the truth of this assumption as
too plain to require discussion. On the few occasions when the Board
has sought to explain the Midwest Piping doctrine, it has started from
the proposition that an employer infringes upon his employees freedom
to select their own bargaining representative if he recognizes or contracts
with a labor organization during the pendency of a question concerning
representation. 48 There is no suggestion in any opinion of the Board or
46 "To hold otherwise would be to sanction futile elections and invite abuse of our
process." International Harvester Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1127 (1949). See also TENTH
ANNUAL REPORT, op. cit. supra note 44.
47 The Board has a uniform policy of not proceeding with representation matters
while there are unwaived unfair labor practices charges pending before it. Surprenant
Mfg. Co. v. Alpert, 53 L.R.R.M. 2405 (1963); cf. NLRB v. Trimfit of California, Inc.,
211 F.2d 206, 209 (9th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Electronics Equip. Co., 194 F.2d 650, 651
(2d Cir. 1952).
48 International Harvester Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1949); Radio Corp of
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any court opinion of which I am aware that this effect is not universally
present.
Apparently this proposition rests upon two other assumptions: First,
that recognition is perceived by the employees as an indication of the
employer's choice between the claimants and, second, that the employees
will be likely to vote in accordance with their perception of the em-
ployer's wishes.49
The first assumption is often highly questionable. In fact recognition
may not be an indication of choice. Thus in the Swift & Co. and St.
Louis Independent Packing cases the employer had a uniform practice
of continuing to recognize the incumbent union, and in NLRB v. In-
dianapolis Newspapers, Inc. the employer at first refused to recognize the
insurgent union upon the basis of petitions signed by more than fifty
per cent of the employees. It is not clear in these cases why it is assumed
that the employees will be misled into believing that recognition is an
indication of choice. The election campaigns in the Swift and St. Louis
Independent Packing cases would have made any employee aware that
Swift had contractual relations on a multi-plant basis with three different
meat packing unions.
The second assumption is even more questionable than the first. There
are of course reasons why employees in particular cases might vote in
accordance with their perception of the employer's wishes. They might,
for example, feel that the employer knows better than they what is in
their own best interest. Common observation indicates that this is not
likely to be true very often. And, moreover, one might suppose that
employees with such a high regard for the employer's wisdom and with
such assurance of his solicitousness for their welfare would not vote for
any union.
The employees might, of course, feel that a favored union will be
able to deal with the employer more effectively. It is not altogther clear
to me that a vote cast on the basis of such a consideration is "coerced."
And while one can only speculate as to the prevalence of such an attitude,
America, 74 N.L.R.B. 1729, 1731 (1947); Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B.
1060, 1070 (1945). In support of this conclusion the Board has relied upon language
used by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303
U.S. 261, 267 (1938), to the effect that "once an employer has conferred recognition on
a particular organization it has a marked advantage over any other in securing the
adherence of employees .. " See Flotill Products Inc., 70 N.L.R.B. 119, 120 (1946).
This language was used in a case in which the employer had "fostered," "dominated,"
and otherwise assisted the union recognized. The Supreme COurt cited authority
concerning the importance of recognition in a single union situation. This authority
dated from 1933-1937.
49 St. Louis Independent Packing Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 622, 629 (1960) (by implication);
Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 694, 704 (1943) (by implication enforced).
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my own feeling is that employees are more likely to vote against a union
thought to be favored by the employer on the assumption that it will
not be aggressive enough in advancing their interests, than they are to
vote in its favor because of any potential effectiveness in dealing with
the employer. The term "company union" still has strong pejorative
connotations, and disdain for the "teacher's pet" has deep roots in
American society. 50
Employees may be motivated to vote as they think the employer wishes
out of fear that he will not deal at all with the non-favored union and
that he will engage in reprisals against its supporters. Where recognition
helps to convey this impression, its effect is coercive. But I doubt that
there are many such cases. And I think that in all of them recognition
is accompanied by other acts of discrimination.
If the Board were to reappraise the Midwest Piping doctrine it might
conclude that the assumption that recognition has a coercive effect made
more sense in 1945 than it does now. In many cases in which the Midwest
Piping doctrine has been applied the facts were inconsistent with such a
theory of coercion. The Swift cases were of this type: The company
announced authoritatively to the men that it would recognize whatever
union they chose and its bargaining history of dealing with all unions
would have made this clear after the most superficial examination. Surely
the Board can expect this much sophistication on the part of the em-
ployees.51 Moreover, an employer need not choose so indirect a way of
50 In Note, supra note 23, at 932, the writer comments "were the employer permitted
to recognize one union, it could exert considerable pressure on its employees to choose
that union as their bargaining agent although the unrecognized rival might be the
better representative. Indeed the employer may have intended to recognize the union
that would be less demanding." It may well be that employees will share the skepticism
of the writer of the note concerning the employer's motives.
51 See, e.g., General Elec. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 744 (1954); International Harvester Co.,
87 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1949). In the latter case the employer signed a master agreement with
the incumbent Farm Equipment Workers (FE) during the pendency of a petition at
a particular plant by the challenging UAW. The new contract was applied to the
plant in question. The company and the UAW had signed a master agreement with
respect to the company's plants represented by UAW. The employer kept the employees
informed of the state of negotiations by a series of letters. The election campaigns
centered about the relative attractiveness of the two master agreements. The trial
examiner found the Midwest Piping doctrine inapplicable, because of the absence
of coercion. "It was abundantly clear to the employees that if they preferred the UAW
to the FE all they had to do was vote for it in the election, and the UAW's national
contract would automatically become applicable to them." Id. at 1139. The Board
reversed the examiner. Its direct analysis of the coercion issue consisted of one
sentence in the body of the opinion: "And, as we have pointed out many times, an
employer's election to recognize and deal with a labor organization whose representa-
tive status is in question constitutes serious interference with his employees' freedom
to make their own choice of a bargaining agency," id. at 1126, and one footnote: "The
Trial Examiner appeared to believe that the results of the election in the representa-
tion case were not affected by the acts of the Respondent complained of here. However,
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indicating his preference. He is permitted under the act to state openly
his choice among the rivals.5 2 If the Midwest Piping doctrine is to be
justified it must be established that recognition and negotiation of an
agreement are more effective in influencing employee choice than a
direct statement of preference by the employer.
It might be argued that the negotiation of an agreement puts pressure
upon the employees to vote to retain the agreement and the union which
negotiated it. In St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. NLRB the brief
for the Board stated: "In any subsequent election employees will be
aware that voting for the incumbent union means retention of whatever
practical benefits the union has achieved. There is no such assurance with
respect to the rival union."58 On the other hand the employees might
assume that any agreement currently in force is the minimum that a
new union would obtain. In fact, the company's refusal to offer to an
incoming union the same terms negotiated with the union's predecessor
might well appear to constitute a refusal to bargain in good faith.
The Board has referred to the "unwarranted prestige" which accrues
to the recognized union.54 It is not dear, exactly, what is meant by this
term. To some extent the Board is doubtless relying on the assumption,
discussed above, that recognition carries the mantle of employer approval
as we have uniformly held, the Board cannot base its findings of -unfair labor practices
on speculation as to whether or not the unlawful conduct was actually effective to
influence the employees in a particular case. The proper test is whether or not
such conduct tends to interfere with the free exercise by employees of their rights
under the Act." Id. at 1126 n.8. It is remarkable to hold an employer guilty of a
violation of the act because similar conduct in other cases is likely to be coercive.
But this is what the use of the word "tends" implies. The Board does not appear
to be talking about a tendency in the case before it which it would be difficult to
illustrate with particular proof, for a finding of such a tendency involves "speculation
as to whether or not the unlawful conduct was actually effective to influence the
employees in a particular case."
52 See note 1 supra.
53 Brief for NLRB, pp. 26, 27, St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. NLRB, 129
N.L.R.B. 622 (1960). To the extent that the Midwest Piping doctrine is based on this
"bird in the hand" coercion it should not be applied to recognition apart from the
negotiation of an agreement. The Board heretofore has not differentiated between
the two. The language quoted from Novak Logging Co., text accompanying note 4
supra, is typical in its equation of recognition and the negotiation of an agreement.
Whatever the general validity of this theory of coercion, it would hardly seem
applicable where, as in the Swift cases, the employer at all relevant times was in the
process of negotiating master agreements with both unions. In fact the election
campaign by the losing union was pitched largely in terms of the superiority of its
forthcoming master agreement, the essential features of which were already established
when the election was held. The election was fought on two issues: The incumbent's
performance in the role of bargaining representative since 1954 and the relative advan-
tages of the two master agreements.
54 Scherrer and Davisson Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1587, 1589 (1958); T4nTH ANNUAL
REPORT, op. cit. supra note 44.
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and choice. 55 Beyond this, unwarranted prestige may be thought to accrue
from the position of authority which the recognized union will occupy in
the plant. Union leaders will be dealing with high management officials
with respect to grievances and on the negotiation of an agreement. From
these dealings the union will acquire an aura of responsibility which will
give it an advantage over rivals in a forthcoming election. As noted
above, this prestige factor, to the extent that it is in fact a factor, has
already accrued to an incumbent union and is not likely to be erased by
withdrawing recognition.
With respect to a newly recognized union the likely impact of the
prestige factor is problematical. In many cases grievance machinery
would not be set up prior to the election and the sole factor adding to
the prestige of the union would be the fact that it is negotiating an
agreement with the employer. I doubt that many votes will be swayed by
this fact alone. Indeed, if there is a lengthy bargaining period, backers of
the recognized union may well be disappointed by its inability to achieve
quickly what it promised.
Where an agreement is negotiated and grievance machinery estab-
lished, I would expect that many more employees would be influenced
by their appraisal of the agreement, than would be influenced by the
aura of responsibility stemming from the union's role in processing
grievances. One may even doubt that newly established grievance
machinery will run smoothly enough to cast an aura of responsibility
over the participants. Employees have become accustomed to unions
acting in positions of responsibility. It is not clear that they will be overly
impressed with one more example of a common phenomenon. And in
this regard I would suggest that recognition is more likely to affect the
attitudes of employees previously opposed to any union, than it is to
affect the adherents of one union when another has been recognized. In
the typical Midwest Piping case, the vast majority of the employees are
adherents of one or the other rival unions and only a few are opposed to
any representation.
Implicit in this theory of coercion, and in all of the other theories
discussed, is the assumption that employee choice is made on a totally
unsophisticated basis, and can be easily manipulated. I doubt the validity
of this assumption. Unless one accepts it, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to find a theory which adequately supports the position that recognition
necessarily coerces employees in choosing their bargaining representative.
My point is that the effect of recognition will vary in different circum-
stances. If I am right, it raises the question of whether the Board should
do away with the Midwest Piping doctrine and seek to determine from
55 See Note, supra note 23, at 932.
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the facts of the case before it whether recognition or the negotiation of
an agreement interfered with free choice by the employees.
The argument against abandoning the doctrine is that such a move
would replace certainty with confusion. It would make it difficult, if not
impossible, for employers to know in advance whether they might law-
fully grant recognition to one of the rivals. And it would force the Board
to spend considerable time pouring over the records of cases in order to
make delicate factual judgments, the validity of which would in any case
be doubtful. The Board faced with a rapidly mounting case load cannot
afford the time which would be necessary for such a case by case evalua-
tion. Moreover, the Midwest Piping doctrine, like all doctrines, minimizes
the amount of discretion involved in decision making. It insures that the
Board will not decide cases involving the interests of rival unions on a
partisan basis. Perhaps, more importantly, it helps insure that Board
decisions will be viewed by the parties as the result of the application of
neutral principles to the facts, and not as the result of caprice or bias.
However, the position of employers who seek to obey the law would
not be worsened if the Midwest Piping doctrine were abandoned, for
such employers could still protect themselves by withholding recognition
pending a Board election. The temptation to do so would be great,
especially since recognition of a union later determined to be a minority
union automatically constitutes a violation of the act.56 Abandonment of
the doctrine would mean only that the possibility of lawfully granting
recognition would be available if it appeared from the facts that the effect
of such recognition would not be coercive.
Nor is it dear that abandonment would increase the Board's work
load. The non-recognized union faced with the possibility of the Board's
upholding the employer's grant of recognition to its rival, might prefer
to go ahead with an election rather than file charges or raise objections
based on the grant of recognition. If the decision to go to an election were
made, it might well be that charges would not be filed after the election,
since under the Board's North Elec. Co. decision an unfair labor practice
finding in such case might not lead to an order to withdraw recognition.5 7
While it is true that the Midwest Piping doctrine largely eliminates
the possibility of partisanship by the Board, I have tried to show that it
does so only at a high cost. The Board has the responsibility of bringing
its expert judgment to bear on the individual case before it. It is an eva-
sion of that responsibility for the Board to treat recognition as though its
effect were always the same. And there is no reason why the Board could
56 See International Ladies Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 366 U.S.
731 (1961).
57 See note 36 supra.
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not develop appropriate judicial standards by which to appraise the likely
effect of recognition on a case by case basis.
In many ways the Midwest Piping doctrine is disruptive of smooth
industrial relations. Employers and unions seeking to abide by the
Board's rules have been required to interrupt or postpone bargaining
relationships. Where the doctrine is applied there is a hiatus period in
collective bargaining despite the fact that the majority of employees
desire representation of one sort or another.
CONCLUSION
The Midwest Piping doctrine is based on the assumption that the
effect of recognition is necessarily coercive. This assumption is often
erroneous and therefore the Board should discontinue its practice of
automatically finding a violation whenever recognition and the existence
of a statutory question concerning representation occur together. It
should instead seek to determine the likely effect of recognition in the
individual case before it. Where the employer's alleged violation consists
of continued dealings with an incumbent union the assumption of coer-
cion is particularly questionable. In the situation where one union has
fairly demonstrated its majority status recognition should not be treated
as a violation. A finding of violation in such a case only serves to promote
the importance of the Board's election machinery at the expense of the
employee's freely expressed choice. As such it gives undue importance to
the Board's own procedures.
